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WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE LAW OF DEFAMATION: DOES THE LAW STRIKE A 
FAIR BALANCE BETWEEN THE RIGHTS OF WHISTLEBLOWERS, THE MEDIA  
AND ALLEGED WRONGDOERS? 
David Lewis * 
ABSTRACT 
The Public Interest Disclosure Act only gives rights to workers and makes no mention of any 
connection with existing defamation provisions. However, whistleblowers and the media 
may have cause to fear the use alleged wrongdoers could make of the Defamation Act 2013.     
Having considered the human rights context, this article examines in detail whether or not 
current legislation strikes a reasonable balance between the rights of whistleblowers, 
alleged wrongdoers and the media. The author concludes that it is in society’s interest that 
the balance should be tilted in favour of those who make and disseminate honest 
allegations even if they turn out to be unfounded. Since the media play an important role in 
pressing for investigations of concerns that are raised and publicising the fact that 
wrongdoing has occurred , they too should be protected unless malice can be established. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between defamation and whistleblowing laws in the UK seems to be under-
researched. In many ways this is unsurprising as the whistleblowing statute (the Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 1998) 1 only gives rights to workers 2 and makes no mention of any 
                                                          
*Professor of Employment Law, Middlesex University. The author would like to thank John and Maureen 




connection with existing defamation provisions. Indeed, since whistleblowers were given no 
special protection from libel or slander, the normal defences to such actions were assumed 
to apply (these are discussed below). However, defamation laws can have a considerable 
impact on alleged wrongdoers, actual and potential whistlelblowers as well as the media. 
Whistleblowing and defamation both concern the right to freedom of expression/speech 
and how this can be balanced with the right to protect reputation and privacy.  
Coincidentally, in 2013 both types of statute introduced a public interest test. In the case of 
whistleblowing, this test must be satisfied if a ‘qualifying disclosure’ is to be protected 3 and 
in relation to defamation, the public interest can now be used as a specific statutory 
defence 4. Having considered the human rights context in the next paragraph, the rest of the 
article will examine in detail whether or not current legislation now strikes a reasonable 
balance between the rights of whistleblowers, alleged wrongdoers and the media.  
             Subject to Article 10 (2) which specifically mentions the protection of others,5 Article 
10 (1) of the European Convention of Human Rights guarantees everyone ‘freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority….’. Section 3 (1) of the Human Rights Act 1998,  states that ‘so far as it is possible 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1
 The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (henceforward PIDA 1998) inserted a new Part IVA into the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 (henceforward ERA 1996). 
2
 ‘Worker’ is broadly defined in ERA 1996 s 43K. 
3
  ERA 1996 s43B defines ‘qualifying disclosures’. ERA 1996 s 43A states that a ‘protected disclosure’ is a 
‘qualifying disclosure…which is made by a worker in accordance with any of sections 43C to 43H’. 
4
 Defamation Act 2013 s 4. 
5
 ‘The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary’. 
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to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a 
way which is compatible with the Convention rights’. Although the Defamation Act 2013 
was primarily aimed at protecting journalists rather than whistleblowers and citizens 
generally, it can be argued that there is no public interest in self-censorship where 
wrongdoing is suspected. Indeed, in the case of Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd,6 Lord 
Bingham C.J. acknowledged that ‘the common convenience and welfare of a modern plural 
democracy such as ours are best served by an ample flow of information to the public 
concerning, and by vigorous public discussion of, matters of public interest to the 
community. By that we mean matters relating to the public life of the community and those 
who take part in it…’. He used the expression ‘public life’ widely so as to include matters 
such as the governance of public bodies, institutions and companies as well as the conduct 
of government and public administration. There can be no doubt today that both the Court 
of Appeal and the Supreme Court appreciate the ‘chilling effect’ the threat of defamation 
proceedings may have on freedom of expression. What is missing is any recognition of this 
in the whistleblowing legislation itself.  
2.  WHAT IS WHISTLEBLOWING AND WHY MIGHT IT LEAD TO DEFAMATORY 
STATEMENTS? 
 
In order to have a meaningful discussion about the impact of defamation laws on the 
whistleblowing process we need to outline what we mean by whistleblowing. There is no 
universally recognised definition but researchers have frequently relied on the following: 
‘The disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or 
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organisations that 
                                                          
6
 [2001] AC 127. 
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may be able to effect action’. 7 It can be observed that this covers anonymous reporting and 
the use of both internal and external channels of communication. However, this formulation 
does not match statutory definitions in the UK or elsewhere. The stated aim of the PIDA 
1998 is ‘to protect individuals who make certain disclosures of information in the public 
interest’. It sets out the type of disclosure 8 which can give rise to protection (a ‘qualifying 
disclosure’); the circumstances in which a ‘qualifying disclosure’ will be protected (a 
‘protected disclosure’); and the workers  to whom the protection applies.9 Section 43B of 
the ERA 1996 lists a wide range of matters that could give rise to a ‘qualifying disclosure’ but 
for workers to be protected they must reasonably believe that the disclosure is made ‘in the 
public interest’. 10 The public interest is undefined and is left open in the same way as in the 
common law defence to an alleged breach of the duty of confidentiality.11 
              For those who suspect that wrongdoing is being committed, the most obvious 
mechanism for avoiding defamation proceedings is to remain silent! Yet not everyone can 
exercise this option because a duty to report can be imposed by statute 12 or contract. 
Indeed, the common law implies that senior employees and those with fiduciary duties 
                                                          
7
  J. Near and M. Miceli, ‘Organisation dissidence: the case of whistleblowing.’ (1985) 4 Journal of Business 
Ethics.1. 
8
 ‘Disclosure’ is not defined for these purposes but it covers both oral and written communications. See: Kraus 
v Penna plc [2004] IRLR 260. 
9
 ERA 1996 ss 43B -43H. See J. Ashton, ‘15 years of whistleblowing protection under the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998: Are We Still Shooting the Messenger?’ (2015) 44 Industrial Law Journal  29. 
10
  The public interest test was inserted by Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 s 17.  
11
 For an example of the application of the public interest defence at common law see: Initial Services v 
Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396. 
12
  For example, under Criminal Justice Act 1993 s93A (money laundering) or anti-terrorism legislation.  
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should report wrongdoing,13 and there is nothing to prevent express terms being inserted to 
compel all employees to make disclosures.14 One consequence of people being required to 
disclose information where they have a reasonable suspicion is that it can lead to false 
allegations being made inadvertently and thus possible defamation proceedings. As we 
discuss below, defences will often be available but neither defamation nor whistleblowing 
legislation will protect those who knowingly supply false information. In the next two 
sections, we will examine in detail the chances of those who believe that they have been 
defamed bringing proceedings and the possible defences available to whistleblowers, 
employers and the media.   
3 WHAT CONSTITUTES DEFAMATION? 
In essence, a claimant must establish that the words complained about were defamatory 
and caused (or were  likely to cause) serious harm to the reputation of him or her, that they 
referred to him or her and were published by the defendant. A person’s reputation is 
harmed where there is a statement which tends ‘to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of 
right –thinking members of society generally’. 15 In theory this is an objective standard and 
the judge will decide both what the words used are capable of meaning and what they 
actually mean. In practice the courts have tended to use a reasonable person test to identify 
what right -thinking people might believe. 16 A particularly pertinent example here is the 
                                                          
13
 See Item Software v Fassihi [2004] IRLR 928. 
14
 To the author’s knowledge this is not uncommon in both the financial and social care sectors. 
15
  Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All E. R. 237. The Defamation Act 2013 s 15 defines a ‘statement’ as ‘words, pictures, 
visual images, gestures or any other method of signifying meaning’. 
16
  Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234. 
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case of Byrne v Deane. 17 Byrne was a golf club member who alleged that a verse on a 
noticeboard implied that he had informed the police about the presence of illegal gambling 
machines on the premises. The Court of Appeal ruled that an allegation that Byrne reported 
a crime to the police could not be regarded as lowering his reputation in the eyes of a ‘good 
and worthy subject of the King’. This decision has been criticised for giving little weight to 
the imputation of disloyalty and improperly reflecting the general standards of society at 
the time.  Since the meaning of words must be seen in the light of the existing 
circumstances, there can be little doubt that a court today would reject the argument that 
being labelled a whistleblower necessarily damaged a person’s reputation. One 
consequence is that a whistleblower who was identified when he or she wished to remain 
anonymous would have to sue for breach of confidence rather than defamation. 18 
                   Context will be highly relevant where a person complains about words used in the 
process of whistleblowing. As mentioned above, workers may have a statutory or 
contractual duty to report where they reasonably suspect that somebody is involved in 
wrongdoing. Indeed, there may well be a procedure for raising concerns which prescribes 
how this should be done and explains that defamatory statements must be avoided. Much 
will hinge on the particular meaning attributed to the words used. For example, did they 
mean that the claimant was guilty of wrongdoing; that there are reasonable grounds to 
suspect him or her of wrongdoing or that there are grounds for investigating the claimant. 
These three possible interpretations are in descending order of seriousness. Indeed, in 
                                                          
17
  [1937] 1 KB 818. 
18  Many whistleblowing procedures in both the public and private sector and some statutes in other countries 
expressly permit anonymous reporting. On the content of whistleblowing procedures generally see D.Lewis,  
‘The contents of whistleblowing/confidential reporting procedures in the UK: some lessons from empirical 
research’. (2006) 28 Employee Relations 76. 
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relation to the third, a defendant might argue that any harm caused would be negatived by 
an investigation which exonerated the claimant. It must be noted here that, although a 
whistleblower might argue that his or her intention was not to defame but to use the 
employer’s procedure to ensure that a suspicion of wrongdoing was investigated, in 
defamation cases intention is only relevant to defences or damages. 
                     In relation to the need for the defamatory material to refer to the claimant, it is 
well established that the claimant need not be named if reasonable people would 
understand that he or she was involved, for example, through mention of a job title. Equally, 
where defamatory words refer to more than one person, a court will have to detemine 
whether there is something in them or the circumstances (for example, the group size) that 
indicates a particular claimant. Nevertheless, if there is a very specific allegation against an 
entire group, each group member might be able to claim.19 Finally,  allegations about the 
behaviour of an organisation may imply that there has been  wrongdoing by its directors or 
senior executives and vice versa. 20  
                As regards publication, all that is needed is for there to be communication of the 
relevant material to one person other than the claimant. Thus a defamatory allegation of 
wrongdoing made by a whistleblower to his or her employer would suffice, although it 
might be difficult for the claimant to establish that damage is caused. For example, if the 
concern is investigated and thought to be unfounded the employer might not even inform 
the suspect of the fact that it was raised. One side effect of an employer complying with the 
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 Knuppfer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944]AC 116. 
20




implied duty of trust and confidence - which requires allegations of wrongdoing to be sifted 
to ensure that employees do not suffer unnecessary stress 21– would be to prevent some 
people from knowing that a defamatory statement had been made about them.  A further 
consequence of employers engaging in the process of filtering allegations is that 
whistleblowers may be protected from defamation proceedings. Section 1 of the 
Defamation Act 2013 has also made life more difficult for alleged wrongdoers to sue 
because they are now required to show that ‘publication caused or is likely to cause serious 
harm to the reputation of the claimant’. Thus a potential defendant can argue that if an 
employer concludes that a defamatory allegation made by a whistleblower is not worth 
investigating or, if an investigation clears the subject of the allegation of any wrongdoing, no 
serious harm has incurred. Importantly, the case of Lewis v Daily Telegraph 22 provides some 
support for the proposition that right –thinking people would not believe that whenever an 
employer holds an investigation there is guilt. Although companies can sue for damage to 
their business reputation if a whistleblower makes a defamatory statement,23 section 1 of 
the Defamation Act 2013 requires ‘serious financial loss’ to be shown.  The obvious rationale 
for requiring serious harm to be demonstrated is that to allow a person to sue where there 
is minimal damage to reputation would undermine the right to freedom of expression.  
4 DOES IT MATTER IF THERE IS SLANDER RATHER THAN LIBEL? 
                                                          
21
  See Yapp v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2015] IRLR 112. 
22
 [1964] AC 234. 
23
  See McDonald’s Corp v Steel (No.4) [1995] 3 All E.R 615. However, trading bodies cannot get damages for 
injury to feelings. 
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Traditionally libels are identified by their permanent form (e.g. in writing) while slander is 
temporary (for example, oral statements). Although the distinction between libel and 
slander is not always clear it is still relevant today. This is because if libel occurs damage is 
presumed, whereas slander often requires proof of special loss.24 One exception to the need 
to establish special damage is where there is an imputation that a criminal offence has been 
committed which is punishable by imprisonment. However, importantly from a 
whistleblower’s perspective, an allegation that a person is suspected of a crime has been 
held to be insufficient.25 Another common law exception is where there is criticism of a 
person’s professional competence. This was extended by section 2 of the Defamation Act 
1952 to cover ‘words calculated to disparage the plaintiff in any office, profession, calling, 
trade or business held or carried on by him’.  
                        In relation to whistleblowing, an interesting question arises about the 
remoteness of any special damage that is suffered. In a scenario mirroring the facts in Vicars 
v Wilcocks, 26 what if a whistleblower slandered an alleged wrongdoer and this resulted in 
the latter’s wrongful or unfair dismissal? In the light of the approach taken by Lord 
Wensleydale in Lynch v Knight ,27 it would appear that the chain of causation is not 
necessarily severed by an unlawful dismissal: ‘To make the words actionable by reason of 
special damage, the consequences must be such as, taking human nature as it is, with its 
infirmities and having regard to the relationship of the parties concerned, might fairly and 
                                                          
24
  However, as pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, it is arguable that the distinction has been ‘severely 
eroded’ by the fact that the Defamation Act s 1 requires ‘serious harm’ to be demonstrated (see above).  
25
  See Simmons v Mitchell (1880) 6 A C 156. 
26
 [1806] East 1. 
27
 [1861] 9 H. L. C. 597 at 600. 
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reasonably have been anticipated and feared would follow from the speaking of the words’.  
Thus, although it might be tempting to argue that a whistleblower’s oral allegations of 
wrongdoing are less likely to result in proceedings for defamation, for example, because it 
might be more difficult to establish that they were published, it would seem that 
whistleblowers cannot necessarily protect themselves by refusing to put their concerns in 
writing. This situation is helpful to employers who are likely to prefer detailed allegations to 
be fully and clearly documented so that they can be investigated properly.  
5   WHAT DEFENCES ARE AVAILABLE? 
A. Consent or voluntary assumption of risk 
Potential defendants might try to argue that the existence of a whistleblowing procedure 
(contractual or otherwise) at the workplace means that staff covered by it expressly or 
impliedly consent (or assume the risk) that the publication of concerns about alleged 
wrongdoing might be defamatory. However, in the author’s opinion this would be wishful 
thinking since the courts are likely conclude that any consent or assumption of risk relates 
to the raising of concerns in a non-defamatory way. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the case 
of Friend v Civil Aviation Authority 28, where it was held that there was consent to 
republication. In this case a number of senior employees had written memoranda which 
were highly critical of the claimant. Amongst other matters, it was alleged that he was 
incapable of doing his job and had made improper or fraudulent expenses claims. These 
statements formed the basis of formal disciplinary proceedings against him. Having failed to 
obtain compensation for unfair dismissal, Captain Friend issued writs for defamation against 
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  [1998] IRLR 253. 
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both his employer and the authors of the memoranda. Because the limitation period in 
respect of the original publication of the memoranda had expired,29 Friend sought to rely on 
their republication to the members of the internal disciplinary and appeals panels. 
According to the Court of Appeal, inquiries cannot be conducted without access to 
documents, so employees who accept a disciplinary code as part of their contract of 
employment consent to the republication of an accusation as part of that process. This is so 
even if the accusations were false or malicious since it is the purpose of investigations to 
determine whether allegations are true or not. However, it was only the republication which 
was covered by the employee’s consent. Thus it would seem that, in principle, workers can 
sue when a whistleblower’s allegations are defamatory but cannot complain that they are 
repeated during the process of investigation if that was part of an agreed procedure.  
Inevitably, this adds weight to the argument that whistleblowing procedures should be 
introduced, publicised and made contractually binding.30 
 
B.   Privilege 
The principle of privilege was introduced to advance the public interest, which is a concept 
that now has a statutory manifestation as a result of section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 
(see below). The rationale for absolute privilege is that in some circumstances people will 
only speak out if they are assured that even if what they say turns out to be false they will  
be immune from defamation suits. In order to encourage the reporting of alleged 
wrongdoing, some jurisdictions have afforded such privilege to whistleblowers who report 
                                                          
29
  The normal limitation period is one year: Defamation Act 1996 ss 5 and 6. 
30
  D.Lewis, ‘Ten years of public interest disclosure legislation in the UK: are whistleblowers adequately 
protected?’.  (2008)  82 Journal of Business Ethics 497. 
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in accordance with the provisions of the relevant legislation. Thus alleged wrongdoers are 
likely to be denied redress unless statements prove both false and malicious. 31 Indeed, such 
statements can give rise to both criminal and civil liability.32 In the UK, absolute privilege 
applies to statements made in either of the Houses of Parliament 33 and judicial 
proceedings.34 This covers employment tribunal hearings where whistleblowing cases are 
initially heard 35 and will extend to witnesses who give evidence as well as the parties and 
their representatives. Inevitably, it will be the role of the judge to ensure that people do not 
abuse the trial situation to engage in gratuitous defamatory remarks. Witness statements in 
preparation for proceedings are also covered but again the material must be relevant to the 
nature of the hearing.36 For similar reasons, lawyer - client communications might attract 
both legal professional privilege 37and be privileged for defamation purposes. However, the 
Court of Appeal has suggested that qualified privilege might suffice in non-contentious 
matters.38 In relation to whistleblowing, it is important to note the case of Mahon v Rahn 
(No. 2)39 where absolute privilege was applied to a document created by a financial 
                                                          
31
  See, for example, the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Commonwealth of Australia) s 10(2) which offers 
absolute privilege to those who make a public interest disclosure. However, s11 makes it clear that people will 
be liable to civil, criminal or administrative proceedings if they knowingly make ‘a statement that is false or 
misleading’.  
32
 The possibility of bring a claim for malicious falsehood is discussed below. 
33
 See the Bill of Rights 1688.  
34
 The Defamation Act 1996 s 14 (as amended) confirms that absolute privilege applies to all fair and accurate 
contemporaneous reports of public proceedings in any court. 
 
35
 See Wilson v Westney [2001] EWCA Civ 239. 
36
 Iqbal v Mansoor [2013] EWCA Civ 149. 
37
 ERA 1996 s 43D  protects disclosures made in the course of obtaining legal advice. 
38
  Waple v Surrey CC [1998] 1 WLR 860. 
39
 [2000] 4 AER 41. 
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regulator as part of an investigation.40 In this case there is explicit recognition that the 
threat of defamation proceedings could have an inhibiting effect on the flow of information 
from potential reporters of alleged wrongdoing.  
                  Turning to qualified privilege under statute, the effect of section 15 and Schedule I 
of the Defamation Act 1996 is to make certain statements ‘privileged subject to explanation 
or contradiction’. 41 However, this will not apply ‘to the publication to the public, or a 
section of the public, of a matter which is not of public concern and the publication of which 
is not for the public benefit’.42 As regards whistleblowing, paragraphs 11A, 12 &13 of 
Schedule 1 to this Act may be particularly relevant. The first two paragraphs cover the ‘fair 
and accurate report of proceedings’ at press conferences and public meetings anywhere in 
the world 43 for the discussion of matters of public interest, while the last refers to ‘a 
general meeting of a UK listed company’ and copies and extracts from any document 
circulated to members of a listed company. These provisions may provide whistleblowers 
with suitable opportunities to make allegations of wrongdoing but, as with common law 
qualified privilege, such statutory privilege is forfeited if the publication is shown to have 
been made with malice (see below).  
 
                                                          
40
  ERA 1996 s 43F can protect workers who make qualifying disclosures to the persons prescribed in the Public 
Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) Order 2014  SI  2014/2418. Such people include industry regulators. 
41
 i.e. this defence is not available if the plaintiff requested the defendant to publish a letter or statement by 
way of explanation or contradiction and the defendant refused or neglected to do so: Defamation Act 1996 s 
15(2). 
42
  Defamation Act 1996 s15(3) ‘Section of the public’ is also mentioned in Defamation Act 2013 s8(1) and is an 
emerging issue in the case law on whistleblowing (see below). 
43
 ‘whether admission to the meeting is general or restricted’. 
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                     In Adam v Ward 44 a privileged occasion at common law was described as: ‘an 
occasion where the person who makes a communication has an interest, or a duty, legal, 
social or moral, to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is 
so made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. This reciprocity is essential’.45 
Clearly, workers in the same organisation have a common interest in the business of the 
employer and this will entitle them to disclose information about the conduct of fellow 
staff. 46 Indeed, as a result of the introduction of whistleblowing legislation it is easy to 
assert that workers  generally (if not citizens) have a social or moral if not a legal duty to 
disclose information about suspected wrongdoing. Equally, all those designated in Part IVA 
of the ERA 1996 as potential recipients of concerns might be deemed to have an interest in 
receiving relevant information within their remit.  One lacuna is where defamatory 
information is sent that is outside the remit of the recipient, for example when material is 
sent to an inappropriate industry regulator. In these circumstances a claimant’s assertion 
that the recipient had no relevant duty or interest might be reinforced by the fact that Part 
IVA of the ERA 1996 does not oblige regulators to pass on information to an appropriate 
person. Another potential legal problem area is when a worker chooses to make a 
disclosure of information which is defamatory to his or her employer about wrongdoing that 
it is not occurring at the workplace, for example, environmental pollution in another country 
over which the employer has no control . This could well be a protected disclosure under 
Part IVA of the ERA 1996 , but, if it was contended that the employer had no interest in 
receiving it, a judge would have to decide whether or not a social or moral duty existed. 
                                                          
44
  [1917] AC 309. 
45
 Media qualified privilege (the ‘responsible journalism’ test) is discussed below.  
46
 See Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130. 
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However, the very fact that the disclosure was protected under Part IVA of the ERA 1996 
might influence the outcome.47  It almost goes without saying that qualified privilege would 
be available (subject to malice) if the same concern was received by a person who did have 
such an interest, for example, the Environmental Agency, an MP or news media.  
                                  Despite the possible problem areas alluded to above, it is true to say that 
in many situations both persons disclosing information about alleged wrongdoing and the 
most likely recipients of a concern (for example, employers, industry regulators, police, MPs 
or news media) will satisfy the duty/interest test. However, it might be more difficult to 
establish that the requirement of reciprocity is met where information is simply posted on 
the web or disseminated via social media (we return to disclosures via the internet later) . It 
is also worth observing that, in deciding whether or not qualified privilege applies, the 
courts will be influenced by whether what is reported are suspicions or verified allegations 
and whether any defamatory statements include material which is irrelevant to the 
particular concern raised. In this respect it is worth mentioning employment references.  
These would normally attract qualified privilege because both the provider of the reference 
and the recipient will satisfy the duty/interest. The subject of the reference, who  has a 
separate interest, will want to ensure that the best possible testimonial is supplied and, if 
and when he or she sees the document, may object to any negative aspects. However, 
employers who take reasonable care not to give misleading information cannot be guilty of 
negligence 48 and can rely on qualified privilege as a defence to defamation unless malice is 
shown. One interesting question here is whether it is malicious for an employer to state that 
                                                          
47
  As discussed below, for a disclosure to be protected the worker must reasonably believe that the disclosure 
is in the public interest.  
48
  Kidd v Axa Equity [2000] IRLR 301.  
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an allegation of wrongdoing by the subject of the reference has been received but fail to 
indicate that the individual was exonerated or that no investigation was thought to be 
necessary?  
                            For malice to be established it has to be shown that the defendant did not 
have an honest belief in the truth of what was stated, had an improper motive or acted out 
of spite.  Thus malice exists if the defendant knew what he or she was publishing was untrue 
or was reckless about the truth. 49 Motives are difficult to establish and may be mixed 50 so 
the tendency has been to focus on the predominant purpose. Perhaps more difficult is 
where the defendant honestly believes that what was said was true but appears to have an 
improper motive. In Horrocks v Lowe 51 the House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal and 
ruled that honest belief was sufficient even if it could be established that the defendant was 
personally prejudiced against the claimant. In relation to whistleblowing, while it might be 
argued that the particular language used when a concern was raised was indicative of an 
improper motive, there might be more mileage in examining the mode of publication. For 
example, a confidential report to an employer using an internally designated whistleblowing 
procedure is more likely to be regarded as benign than an unnecessarily public disclosure.52  
 
                                                          
49
  Halpin v Brookes University [1995] EWCA Civ 1130 [unreported]. 
50
  This is one of the arguments that led to the removal of ‘good faith’ as a necessary ingredient for a disclosure 
to be protected under ERA 1996 Part IVA. However, it is still relevant to the assessment of compensation 
where detriment or dismissal is proved. 
51
 [1975] AC 135. 
52
  Amongst other requirements, external public disclosures have to pass a test of reasonableness under ERA 
1996 ss 43G and H in order to be protected.  
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                   Those affected by a false but non-defamatory allegation of wrongdoing may try 
to sue for malicious falsehood. This is a tort that seeks to protect financial interests rather 
than personal reputation and there is no defence of qualified privilege available. It has to be 
proved that a false statement was made maliciously to a person other than the claimant. 
This will cover situations where the defendant does not care whether the statement is true 
or false but negligence itself does not amount to malice. The damage suffered may simply 
be the way in which other people act towards the claimant and, according to section 3(1) of 
the Defamation Act 1952 it is sufficient for a claimant to show that what was published in 
writing was ‘calculated to cause pecuniary damage’. Thus an aggrieved individual might 
bring an action if it can be demonstrated that a whistleblower maliciously made a false 
allegation of wrongdoing with the aim of causing the plaintiff to lose money as a result of 
transfer, demotion, dismissal etc. Malicious falsehood actions may be particularly attractive 
to companies since, unlike in defamation cases, there is no need to show that serious 
financial loss has been inflicted.53  
 
C   Substantial truth 
Section 2  of the Defamation Act 2013 removed the common law defence of justification 
and replaced it by substantial truth. The underlying principle is that the dissemination of the 
truth is in the public interest and this outweighs any private interest in concealing 
information. Significantly, section 2(3) makes it clear that if one or more imputation is not 
substantially true the defence is still available if ‘having regard to the imputations which are 
shown to be substantially true, the imputations which are not shown to be substantially 
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  Defamation Act 2013 s1(2) applies to ’bodies that trade for profit’. 
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true do not seriously harm the claimant’s reputation’. The burden is on the defendant to 
show that statements made were substantially true but he or she does not have to be 
aware of that fact at the time the statements were made. Thus it would seem that this 
defence is an attractive one for those who make allegations of wrongdoing, especially when 
motive is not treated as relevant here. By way of comparison, sections 43F -43H of the  ERA 
1996 all require that ‘the worker reasonably believes that the information disclosed, and 
any allegations contained in it, are substantially true’.54 Thus it is critical for both defamation 
and whistleblowing purposes to know at what point a departure from the literal truth will 
undermine the argument that a statement or allegation was substantially true.  
                      While access to supporting evidence may be difficult for defendants in 
defamation proceedings, searching for it can deprive whistleblowers of the protection 
afforded by the ERA 1996.  It would seem that, although whistleblowers must reasonably 
believe that their information ‘tends to show’ a particular type of wrongdoing, 55 workers 
who suffer a detriment for trying to investigate or prove certain facts can fall outside the 
scope of Part IVA of the ERA 1996. Thus in Bolton School v Evans 56 the employer 
successfully argued that the claimant was dismissed for conducting his own inquiries about 
computer security and not for disclosing information about its deficiencies. According to 
Elias, J. in the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT): ‘It (the Act) does not protect the actions 
of the employee which are directed to establishing or confirming the reasonableness of that 
                                                          
54
 In Korashi v Abertawe University Health Board  [2012] IRLR 4 the EAT held that it was insufficient to ‘show 
that the matter complained of was believed to be substantially true when a number of allegations were not so 
believed’. 
55
  ERA 1996 s 43B (1)(a) –(f) list six types of wrongdoing.  
56
  [2007] IRLR 140. 
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belief. The protection is for the whistleblower who reasonably believes .. that something is 
wrong, not the investigator who seeks either to establish that it is wrong or to show that his 
concerns are reasonable’.57 The unfortunate effect of drawing a distinction between 
dismissal because of acts related to disclosure (unprotected) rather than because of the 
disclosure itself (protected) may well be to deter attempts at verification aimed at 
establishing reasonable grounds for a belief and thus safeguarding the worker’s 
employment rights. The consequence in defamation proceedings may be that a defendant 
lacks the evidence to demonstrate truth even though the allegations are not in fact false. In 
these circumstances, it will be necessary to turn to some other defence.  
D    Honest opinion 
Section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013 removed the common law defence of fair comment 
and replaced it by honest opinion. For this to be available there must be a statement of the 
opinion that the defendant holds,58 an indication of the basis for it and an honest person 
could have held the opinion on the basis of – (a) ‘any fact which existed at the time the 
statement complained of was published’. Although the statement must be recognisable as 
comment, the distinction between fact and opinion may be difficult to draw. While an 
inference from facts may constitute a form of opinion,59 the defence will not apply to 
statements of fact which are capable of objective proof. For example, where a person 
asserts that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant is guilty of a crime. 60 
                                                          
57
  Bolton School v Evans [2006] IRLR 500 at p 507. See also Panayiotou v Chief Constable of Hampshire [2014] 
IRLR 500. 
58
 Whether the defendant holds the opinion is a subjective test: Defamation Act 2013, Explanatory Notes para 
26. 
59
 See British Chiropractic Association v Singh [2011] 1 WLR 133.  
60
  See Hamilton v Clifford [2004] EWCA Civ. 1407. 
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Nevertheless, paragraph 28 of the Explanatory Notes to this Act provides some comfort for 
whistleblowers by stating that  a defendant should be able to satisfy the conditions set out 
in section 3 ‘without needing to prove the truth of every single allegation of fact relevant to 
the statement complained of’. In addition, section 3(6) of the Defamation Act 2013 may 
have consequences for employers who do not carefully scrutinise concerns raised in the 
whistleblowing process because it makes a person liable for republication ‘if the claimant 
shows that the defendant knew or ought to have known that the author did not hold the 
opinion’.  
                         In relation to the distinction between fact and opinion there would appear to 
be a clear parallel with the statutory whistleblowing provisions. Whereas sections 43C –E of 
the ERA 1996 are based solely on disclosures of information which tend to show 
wrongdoing (facts), sections 43F-H refer to ‘any allegation contained in it”’(opinion). In 
Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management Ltd v Geduld 61  Slade,J  gave the following 
hypothetical example in relation to a hospital: ‘ Communicating “information” would 
be ”The wards have not been cleaned for the past two weeks. Yesterday sharps were left 
lying around”. Contrasted with that would be a statement that “you are not complying with 
health and safety requirements”. In our view this would be an allegation not information.’ 
Another interesting comparison is that of the ‘honest person could have held’ test in section 
3(4) of the Defamation Act 2013  and the ‘reasonable belief of the worker’ test in  section 
43B of the ERA 1996.  In theory, it might be argued that the latter has both a subjective and 
objective element whereas the former requires a purely objective approach. However, an 
employment tribunal might well equate a reasonable belief with an ‘honest belief on 
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 [2010] IRLR 38. 
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reasonable grounds’ so the tests may not be distinct in practice. Indeed, there may be some 
virtue in applying the same test in both types of case.  
E   Public interest 
For the defence of honest opinion to apply the statement does not have to be about a 
matter of public interest. However, for section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 to apply the 
defendant must show not only that ‘the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a 
statement on a matter of public interest’ but also that he or she reasonably believed that 
publishing it was in the public interest. The defence applies whether the statement is one of 
fact or opinion 62 and, in adjudicating on the public interest, ‘the court must have regard to 
all the circumstances of the case’. Although the defence is available to all those who have 
made a false statement, section 4(4) provides that ‘the court must make such allowance for 
editorial judgment as it considers appropriate’.  
                     Inevitably the absence of a statutory definition of ‘public interest’ creates 
uncertainty.63 However,it is clearly designed to replace the defence created in Reynolds v 
Times Newspapers 64 so the principles established there and in subsequent cases are likely 
to be taken into account. 65 In the Reynolds case, a former Prime Minister of the Irish 
Republic claimed that there had been defamatory statements about his handling of political 
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  The Reynolds defence (see below) only applied to statements of fact. 
63  According to the Defamation Act 2013 Explanatory Notes para 30 : ‘…….[the public interest] is a concept 
which is well-established in the English common law. It is made clear that the defence applies if the statement 
complained of “was, or formed part of, a statement on a matter of public interest” to ensure that either the 
words complained of may be on a matter of public interest, or that a holistic view may be taken of the 
statement in the wider context of the document, article etc in which it is contained in order to decide if overall 
this is on a matter of public interest.’ 
64
 [2001] 2 AC 127. The Defamation Act 2013 s 4(6) states that the ..’the Reynolds defence is abolished’. 
65
 See Defamation Act 2013 Explanatory Notes para 35.  
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matters. The House of Lords refused to accept that the common law should recognise 
‘political information’ as a species of the qualified privilege defence. As we have seen above, 
for qualified privilege to be available there must be both a duty to disseminate the 
information and an interest in receiving it. The relevant interest here is that of freedom of 
expression and, in developing a “responsible journalism” approach, Lord Nicholls identified 
ten non-exhaustive factors to be taken into account (see below). Although the House of 
Lords accepted in this case that the subject was of public interest, it concluded that the 
newspaper was unprotected because it had failed to mention the claimant’s explanation of 
the events which was available to it.  
                         In the subsequent case of Flood v Times Newspapers, 66 the Supreme Court 
held that an article about police corruption was of considerable public interest and that, 
where there was strong circumstantial evidence against Flood, it was sufficient that the 
author believed in the truth of the allegations and held a reasonable belief based on a 
reasonable investigation. Indeed, publication had the aim of getting allegations investigated 
in circumstances where it was reasonable to believe that this was not occurring.  Similarly, 
in Hunt v Times Newspapers,67 the defence was applied to a journalist who used reliable 
sources, honestly believed the allegations that the claimant was a ‘crime lord’, and  behaved 
fairly in acquiring the information. For the purposes of this article, it is important to note 
that the ‘responsible journalism’ approach applied to the publication by anybody of public 
interest information and was thus generally available to those raising concerns about 
wrongdoing.  
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  [2012] 2 AC 273. 
67
 [2013] All E.R 89. 
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                          For there to be a ‘qualifying disclosure’,section 43B of the ERA 1996 states 
that a worker making a disclosure of information must reasonably believe that it ‘is made in 
the public interest’. The leading judgment to date was given by the EAT in Chesterton Global 
Ltd v Nurmohammed,68 where the claimant maintained that he was one of a hundred senior 
managers whose bonuses were affected by the employer’s alleged accounts manipulation. 
Supperstone, J. accepted that ‘a relatively small group may be sufficient to satisfy the public 
interest test. What is sufficient is necessarily fact sensitive’. It remains to be seen how far 
the courts will go in finding that there is a qualifying disclosure where a concern relates only 
to a section of the public. Nevertheless, in principle, it would seem that a disclosure of 
information about a breaches of contracts of employment can satisfy the public interest 
test. For example, where it is alleged that an employer has applied a policy that infringes the 
Equality Act 2010.69   
                           In our discussion of the concept of public interest, it is appropriate to 
examine the extent to which the European Court of Human Rights has relied on it in 
deciding cases based on Article 10 of the Convention and comparing it with the approach 
taken to “responsible journalism” in defamation law.  Article 10 (2)  of the ECHR does not 
provide a public interest defence to infringements of the right to freedom of expression but 
does use the words ‘necessary in a democratic society’ 70. However, when we examine the 
principles utilised to interpret these words we see that a public interest test is expressly 
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 [2015] IRLR 614. An appeal against this decision was due to be heard by the Court of Appeal in June 2017.  
69
 According to Superstone, J. at para 36: ‘The words “in the public interest” were introduced to do no more 
than prevent a worker from relying upon a breach of his own contract of employment where the breach is of a 
personal nature and there are no wider public implications’. 
70
  See note 3 above. 
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included. 71 There is a clear parallel here with the factors Lord Nicholls suggested should be 
taken into account in ascertaining whether there had been ‘responsible journalism’. Indeed, 
explicit mention is made of ‘the nature of the information, and the extent to which the 
subject-matter is a matter of public concern’. 72  In the conclusion, it will be argued that 
statutory guidance on the meaning of the public interest would be valuable in assisting 
potential litigants and the judiciary in interpreting both the defamation and whistleblowing 
legislation.  
F    Other defences 
Before discussing some practical issues related to the bringing of defamation proceedings 
we will briefly consider offers to make amends, the defence of innocent dissemination and 
its specific application to  internet service providers (ISP). According to section 2(5) of the 
Defamation Act 1996 an offer to make amends cannot be made after serving a defence 73 
and, if it is accepted, this will end the proceedings. Section 2 (3) & (4) provide that the offer 
of amends must be: in writing and indicate that it is made under section 2;  to make a 
                                                          
71
  In Heinisch v Germany [2011] IRLR 922 the following criteria were applied when assessing the 
proportionality of the interference in relation to the legitimate aim pursued:  (i) the public interest in the 
disclosed information; (ii) whether the applicant had alternative channels for making the disclosure; (iii) the 
authenticity of the disclosed information; (iv) whether the applicant acted in good faith; (v) the detriment to 
the employer; (v) the severity of the sanction. 
72
  The other criteria are: (i) The seriousness of the allegation.The more serious the charge, the more the 
public is misinformed and the individual harmed, if the allegation is not true; (ii) the source of the information. 
Some informants have no direct knowledge of the events. Some have their own axes to grind, or are being 
paid for their stories; (iii) the steps taken to verify the information; (iv)the status of the information. The 
allegation may have already been the subject of an investigation which commands respect; (v) the urgency of 
the matter. News is often a perishable commodity; (vi) whether comment was sought from the plaintiff. He 
may have information others do not possess or have not disclosed. An approach to the plaintiff will not always 
be necessary; (vii) Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff's side of the story. (viii) the tone of the 
article. A newspaper can raise queries or call for an investigation. It need not adopt allegations as statements 
of fact; (ix))the circumstances of the publication, including the timing.  
73
  This would not prevent a person offering to settle a claim in the usual way during proceedings. 
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‘suitable correction’ and ‘sufficient apology’ and to publish them ‘in a manner that is 
reasonable and practicable in the circumstances’; and ‘to pay to the aggrieved party such 
compensation (if any) and such costs, as may be agreed or determined to be payable’. 74 
From a whistleblower’s perspective, an offer of amends would be appropriate in a case of 
mistaken identity but sections 2 -4  the Defamation Act 1996 might also prove useful in  that 
they provide for a qualified offer to be made.  Thus, to use the example given in Winfield 
and Jolowicz 75 if it is alleged that a director’s conduct has resulted in a company having 
financial difficulties ‘the defendant might concede that this imputed incompetence and 
make an offer in respect of that meaning’. The main drawback of making an offer of amends 
is that, if it is relied on as a defence, it cannot be used in conjunction with any other 
defence.76 As we have seen in this article, whistleblowers are likely to have several other 
effective defences open to them.  
                Turning to innocent dissemination, section 1 (1) of the Defamation Act 1996 
provides a defence if it is shown that (i) the person was not the author, editor or publisher 
of the statement; (ii) that reasonable care was taken in relation to its publication; and (iii) 
‘he did not know, and had no reason to believe, that what he did caused or contributed to 
the publication of a defamatory statement.’ In determining whether or not (iii) is applicable, 
section 1(5) states that ‘regard shall be had to  - (a) the extent of his responsibility for the 
content of the statement or the decision to publish it, (b) the nature or circumstances of the 
publication, and (c) the previous conduct or character of the author, editor or publisher’. 
                                                          
74
  S 3 deals with acceptance of an offer to make amends and s 4 deals with a failure to do so. 
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  Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort. 2014. Page 405 
76
  Defamation Act 1996 s 4(4). 
26 
 
Thus, in addition to other defences, section 1 will often be available to managers and 
organisations which publish a whistleblower’s allegations. However, if a whistleblower has a 
history of making unwarranted accusations those who publish further material would be 
advised to check whether it has any defamatory content.  
                      Section 1 (2)  of the Defamation Act 2013  defines ‘author’, ‘editor’ and 
‘publisher’ but section 1(3) excludes those who are ‘only involved – …….(e)  as the operator 
of or provider of access to a communications system by means of which the statement is 
transmitted, or made available, by a person over whom he has no effective control’. In 
Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd 77 the plaintiff claimed that a posting to a newsgroup was 
defamatory and requested that the defendants remove it from their server. They failed to 
do so and Morland J. found them liable because they had not taken reasonable care and 
could not show that they did not know that what they did caused or contributed to the 
publication of a defamatory statement. It would seem that an ISP will only avoid liability if 
its role is entirely passive.78 Those who blow the whistle via the internet are unlikely to be 
covered by Part IVA of the ERA 1996 since the conditions for protecting such disclosures are 
stringent.79 However, where such widespread publication of allegations does occur it is 
probably in a desperate attempt to get them investigated when attempts to report within 
the organisation or to a regulator have failed. 80 Thus it would be most unfortunate if an ISP 
adopted a policy of automatically withdrawing a posting if anybody suggested that it was 
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  [2001] QB 201. 
78
  See Tamiz v Google Inc [2013] 1 WLR 2151. 
79
  See ERA 1996 ss 43G and 43H. 
80
  S 43F deals with disclosures to ‘prescribed persons’.  See note 40 above. 
27 
 
defamatory. Since such a situation might stop material being published even if it was true or 
in the public interest, questions arise about compatibility with Article 10 of ECHR. Section 
5(2) of the Defamation Act 2013 now offers protection where an ‘operator of a website’81 
can show that it did not post the statement. This defence is defeated by malice 82 or ‘if the 
claimant shows that— (a) it was not possible for the claimant to identify the person who 
posted the statement; (b) the claimant gave the operator a notice of complaint in relation to 
the statement; and  (c) the operator failed to respond to the notice of complaint in 
accordance with any provision contained in regulations’. 83 
6   WHAT REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE FOR DEFAMATION AND HOW CAN THEY 
BE OBTAINED? 
 
It is frequently observed that the purpose of bringing defamation proceedings cannot be to 
re-establish one’s reputation since the courts have no power to order a retraction or that a 
correction is published. Nevertheless, section 13 of the  Defamation Act 2013  enables a 
plaintiff to prevent further harm by seeking an order that a website operator removes a 
defamatory statement or  that ‘any person who was not the author, editor or publisher of 
the defamatory statement’ ceases distributing it. Injunctive relief is unlikely to be available 
in whistleblowing situations as claimants are unlikely to have prior notice of the publication 
of defamatory material. Even if a claimant was forewarned, an injunction will not be granted 
if the defendant can offer a defence or if a court is persuaded that the section 12 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 applies. Section 12 (1) and (4)  provide that ‘if a court is considering 
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 This term is not defined.  
82
  Defamation Act 2013 s 5(11).  
83 See Defamation Act 2013 s5(3)  and the Defamation (Operators of Websites) Regulations 2013. SI 2013/ 
3028. Regulation 3 and the Schedule provide for the steps which a website operator must take on receiving a 
valid notice of complaint in order to benefit from the defence provided by s 5. 
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whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention 
right to freedom of expression’ the court ‘must have particular regard to the importance of’ 
this right. 
                   The primary remedy would appear to be damages aimed at restoring the 
claimant’s reputation, vindicating the claimant’s name and compensating for the distress 
caused. 84 Thus the value of a claim against a whistleblower or anyone else publishing his or 
her allegations will depend on the extent to which the plaintiff’s character has been 
impugned and the breadth of the publication. It follows that in some cases it will be difficult 
to establish either serious harm or substantial loss, for example, where the defamatory 
statement does not suggest that a person is guilty of serious wrongdoing and the 
publication was solely internal to the claimant’s employer. Where grave personal 
misconduct is alleged, aggravated damages may be available but exemplary damages are 
unlikely to be awarded because whistleblowers rarely make statements with a view to 
making a profit which outweighs the likely financial penalties for defamation. However, it 
should be remembered that businesses which are defamed are also entitled to damages, 
although they cannot be compensated for hurt feelings! 
                          Turning now to the potential claimants, we are aware that both people and 
businesses can sue. 85 The most obvious problem for an individual wishing to bring a legal 
action is that defamation cases can be extremely expensive and legal aid is unavailable. Any 
lack of financial resources is only partly alleviated by the “no win, no fee” or conditional fee 
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  See Cairns v Modi [2013] 1 WLR 1015 where the Court of Appeal suggested that a ceiling equivalent to the 
maximum level of damages for pain and suffering in personal injury cases would normally be appropriate. 
85
  Although central and local government bodies cannot sue for defamation, individuals employed by them 
can sue in their own right: Derbyshire CC v Times Newspapers Ltd  [1993] AC 534. Government bodies can sue 
for malicious falsehood.  
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system which requires potential claimants to take out insurance against losing. However, 
claimants may be assisted by the availability of summary judgment “if it appears to the 
court that there is no defence to the claim which has a realistic prospect of success, and that 
there is no other reason why the claim should be tried.” 86  A less obvious difficulty is 
identifying the potential defendant. In A v Company B Ltd 87, the High Court granted an 
order for discovery against a company which summarily dismissed a senior employee for 
gross misconduct following allegations made by an external third party informant, without 
disclosing either the specific allegations made against the employee or the identity of the 
informant. The Vice-Chancellor held that disclosure was necessary to enable the employee 
to bring an action for defamation and/or malicious falsehood against the informant in order 
to clear his name. The decision has been criticised for failing to acknowledge how important 
it is for employers to be able to both offer and maintain confidentiality where people have 
information about suspected wrongdoing. 88  Put simply, if those thinking of raising a 
concern believe that there is a risk of being identified and sued for defamation, they might 
opt to remain silent or report anonymously.89 This case provides a vivid illustration of the 
clash of interests that can occur in such situations. The employer and informant have the 
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  Defamation Act 1996s8(3).  According to s 9, summary relief may include: a statement that the statement 
was false and defamatory; and order that the defendant publish a suitable correction and apology; damages of 
up to £10,000; and an order preventing further publication of the matter complained of. 
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 [1997] IRLR 405. 
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  D.Lewis, ‘ A v Company B Ltd’. (1998). 27 Industrial Law Journal 64.  
89
  Anonymous disclosures are problematic for a variety of reasons. From a whistleblower’s perspective, they 
may be identifiable because of the nature or circumstances of the disclosure. From an employer’s point of 
view, anonymity can make investigations difficult to conduct and the information supplied is treated with 
more suspicion.  
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private interest of maintaining confidentiality; 90 the alleged wrongdoer has the private 
interest of restoring his or her reputation and there is the public interest in encouraging the 
raising of concerns about wrongdoing.  It is asserted that the interests of the alleged 
wrongdoer should not be paramount in such situations. This position is reinforced by the 
fact that in practice the chances of him or her succeeding in a defamation or malicious 
falsehood action are fairly slim unless the whistleblower has knowingly supplied false 
information. Thus in A v Company B Ltd  qualified privilege would have been available if the 
informant could establish that he or she had a duty to communicate the allegations and 
Company B had an interest in receiving them.  As we have seen above, more extensive 
defences have become available since 2013.  
                  Where companies suffer damage to their business reputation they may sue for 
malicious falsehood or defamation. However, as regards the latter, we have seen above that 
‘a body that trades for profit’ can only sue if there is ‘serious financial loss’. One salutary 
effect of this relatively new requirement is that threats by employers to bring defamation 
actions against those who raise concerns about their organisation’s wrongdoing  will be less 
credible. Nevertheless, there can little doubt that many people remain ignorant about 
defamation law and will be deterred from making allegations if they cannot prove that what 
they contain is true.  
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  Indeed, if the informant in this case had been an employee who had been given an undertaking about 
confidentiality if he or she offered evidence, the revelation of his or her identity would have amounted to a 
fundamental breach of their contract of employment:  see, for example, Buckland v Bournemouth University 
[2010] IRLR 445. 
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                 As regards potential defendants, from the claimant’s perspective the most obvious 
issue is whether the person is worth suing for damages. 91 From the defendant’s point of 
view the question is whether they can afford to defend an action for defamation and, if not, 
whether they are entitled to legal aid. Significantly, the European Court of Human Rights 
held in Steel & Morris v UK 92  that the denial of legal aid to two environmental campaigners 
constituted breaches of both Article 6 (right to a fair hearing) and Article 10.  Where an 
employee whistleblower has made defamatory statements it would clearly be preferable  in 
most cases if the claimant was able to sue the whistleblower’s employer. The argument that 
the allegations were merely being repeated will not constitute a defence 93 and  Slipper v 
BBC 94 provides authority for the proposition that expressing doubt about the truth of the 
allegations will not affect liability for repetition. Even if another person is liable for 
repetition of a whistleblower’s allegations, the latter will remain liable if he or she 
requested or authorised publication; intended the statement to be repeated; or where 
repetition is the natural and probable result of the original publication.95  
7   CONCLUSION  
It can seen from the discussion above that actions for defamation are unlikely to be 
successful so long as a whistleblower does not raise concerns maliciously. First, an  
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 See McDonalds Corp v Steel (No.4) [[1995] 3 AER 615 where the plaintiff was awarded £76,000 against two 
unwaged people.  
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 [2005] EMLR 15. 
93
  See Mark v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 772.  Indeed, if the defamatory statement was not 
repeated by the employer the plaintiff would probably not have heard of them! 
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  [1991] 1 QB 283. 
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 See Slipper v BBC [1991] 1 QB 283. 
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allegation may not be regarded as defamatory and,second, even if it is, a claimant must 
show that serious harm has been suffered. Lastly, in addition to qualified privilege at 
common law, there are the statutory defences of substantial truth, honest opinion and the 
public interest. In these circumstances it might asked why do whistleblowers need more 
protection from defamation suits? In the author’s view the answer lies in society’s interest 
in having wrongdoing exposed and dealt with. It is not appropriate here to rehearse all the 
arguments for encouraging whistleblowing, suffice it to say that speaking up is a value tool 
for countering corruption and can both directly and indirectly save lives. 96 
                   Research across the world confirms that the two main reasons people are 
reluctant to report perceived wrongdoing is the fear that no corrective action will be taken 
and that they will suffer consequences for raising concerns.97 Even if there is no real 
prospect that a potential whistleblower will be sued for defamation they may still believe 
that to be the case and choose to remain silent. 98 In the author’s opinion, more certainty 
about protection could be achieved by amending both Part IVA ERA 1996 and the 
Defamation Act 2013.  One solution might be to adopt the Australian approach of 
incorporating the defence of absolute privilege into the UK statutory whistleblowing 
provisions. 99 Slightly less desirable -because it would not be so concrete or visible to 
                                                          
96 See I. Carr  and D.Lewis, ‘Combating Corruption through Employment Law and Whistleblower Protection’.   
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  See D. Lewis, A. Brown,  and R. Moberly, ‘Whistleblowing, its importance and the state of research.’ in A. 
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2014. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
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  See footnote 31 above. 
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potential whistleblowers - would be to include a special defence in the Defamation Act 
2013.100  Finally, in order to provide more clarity for potential litigants, advisers and 
adjudicators, it would be useful if criteria for determining the public interest were enacted 
by Parliament in relation to both defamation and whistleblowing. We now turn to this issue.      
                                 Currently there is no legislative guidance or statutory code of practice on 
the interpretation of the public interest in these contexts. Such an approach would be 
consistent with that  taken to the public interest test under both the data protection and 
freedom of information legislation which themselves deal with the issues of privacy and 
access to information.  Thus section 32 (1) (b) of the Data Protection Act 1998 mentions the 
‘special importance of the public interest in freedom of expression’ and section 32(3) goes 
on to state that ‘In considering ...whether the belief of a data controller that publication 
would be in the public interest was or is a reasonable one, regard may be had to his 
compliance with any code of practice which –(a) is relevant to the publication in question, 
and (b) is designated by the Secretary of State..’.101 Similarly, in exempting authorities from 
complying with duties to confirm or deny and to communicate information, a public interest 
test is used in section 2(1)(b) and section 2(2)(b) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.102 
                                                          
100  Perhaps analogous the special defence contained in the Defamation Act 2013 s6 for peer-reviewed 
statements in scientific or academic journals.  
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 To date five codes have been designated in the Schedule to the Data Protection (Designated Codes of 
Practice) (No 2) Order 2000.SI 2000/1864. 
102 S 2(1): ‘Where any provision of Part II states that the duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to 
any information, the effect of the provision is that where either— (a) the provision confers absolute 
exemption, or (b) in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exclusion of the 
duty to confirm or deny outweighs the public interest in disclosing whether the public authority holds the 
information, section 1(1)(a) does not apply’.  S2(2): ‘In respect of any information which is exempt information 
by virtue of any provision of Part II, section 1(1)(b) does not apply if or to the extent that— (a) the information 
is exempt information by virtue of a provision conferring absolute exemption, or (b) in all the circumstances of 
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An applicant can appeal to the Information Commissioner against a decision to refuse access 
to information and this person has prepared guidance to the interpretation of the public 
interest test. 
                      It is not appropriate here to be prescriptive about the precise contents of any 
guidance on the meaning of ‘public interest’ that might be offered for the purposes of the 
defamation and the whistleblowing legislation. Nevertheless, by way of general approach, 
full weight should be given to the principles of transparency and accountability that are so 
vital in both the public and private sectors 103 and to democracy generally. Thus in resolving 
the inevitable conflicts that will arise between the human rights to freedom of speech and 
privacy,104 the author believes that the private interest in safeguarding a personal or 
business reputation should give way to the private interest of whistleblowers and the public 
interest of citizens in freedom of expression. One view would be that all speech or 
disclosures of information should be protected unless the person making them knows them 
to be false.105 No doubt some will argue that the result of relegating the interests of alleged 
wrongdoers will be that more people will suffer untrue defamatory statements without 
redress. However, such an argument must be seen in the light of the fact that, in reality, 
most people will not be able to sue anyway owing to lack of resources and the uncertainties 
in the current law.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the 
information.’ 
103
  The author believes that there are considerable difficulties in drawing a meaningful line between these two 
sectors in 2017. 
104
  Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights deals with respect for private and family life. 
105
  In which case an action for malicious falsehood might be brought. 
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                        The author’s answer to the question posed in the title of this article is that it is 
in society’s interest that the balance should be tilted in favour of those who make and 
disseminate honest allegations even if they turn out to be unfounded. Since the media play 
an important role in pressing for investigations of concerns that are raised and publicising 
the fact that wrongdoing has occurred , it too should be protected unless malice can be 
established. Indeed, it is to be hoped that the introduction of the public interest test into 
defamation law will encourage the media to publicise whistleblower stories and give 
confidence to those who are reluctant to raise concerns. In the writer’s opinion, the UK will 
only comply fully with the spirit of Article 10 of ECHR if it ensures that defamation law does 
not inhibit whistleblowing. By definition, a protected disclosure must satisfy the public 
interest test in section 43B of the ERA 1996 so there can be no objection to inserting 
another section into Part IVA of the ERA 1996 which states that protected disclosures will 
not result in defamation proceedings. However, what is really needed is a more general 
acceptance that where there are conflicting human rights, society’s interest in openness and 
transparency will take precedence over the private interests of alleged wrongdoers. In the 
employment context, protection for the alleged wrongdoer will come from the duty on 
employers to scrutinise allegations and to ensure that those which are unfounded are 
published no further. 
 
  
